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1row ing soc i a l s eparat i on
and wasteful sprawl threaten the
future of Los Angeles and all other
U.S. metropolitan areas. Social
need is concentrated and deepen-
ing in central cities, older suburbs,
and many outlying communities, isolating
those who live there from opportunity. Fast-
developing cities on the urban fringe are struggling to provide expen-
sive schools, roads, sewer systems, and other basic infrastructure for
their burgeoning populations without adequate local resources. Open
space and rural landscapes are being lost to rapid development while
roadways reach unprecedented levels of gridlock, especially in the
vicinities of growing suburban job centers. Meanwhile, these growth
patterns are placing unnecessary strain on the local environment,
resulting in pollution of the air and water and over-consumption of
limited water supplies.
Los Angeles Metropatterns reports on social, economic, and develop-
ment trends in the Los Angeles region
2
and outlines policy strategies for
reform. Its purposes are: 1) to document social separation and sprawl in
the Los Angeles region; 2) to identify specific effects on jurisdictions in
the Los Angeles region; and 3) to introduce
policy strategies that might be used to
address the local and regional impacts of
social separation and sprawl. It is MARC’s
hope that the results of this study will help to
further the processes of reform in the Los
Angeles region. 
With its huge population and land area,
tremendous immigration and diversity, and its multi-centered pattern
of development, Los Angeles is in many ways unique.  However, much
of the evidence of social separation and sprawl follows patterns that
MARC has seen in its studies of other U.S. metropolitan areas.  (In fact,
the patterns are more intense and detrimental in Los Angeles than in
many other parts of the country.) These patterns are illustrated in this
report through the use of color-coded maps generated by geographic
information system (GIS) software.3
The report concludes with a brief discussion of policy strategies for
regional reform aimed at reducing social separation and wasteful land-
use patterns. Among these recommended reforms is a regional tax-shar-
ing proposal (in many ways similar to California’s existing school equity
system), which is discussed in greater detail in Appendix A.
Los Angeles Metropatterns
An overview
G
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t is becoming increasingly apparent that the fiscal, social,
and environmental stresses associated with typical urban devel-
opment patterns are negatively affecting all metropolitan localities
and their residents. Among the many effects are concentrated
poverty and its attendant racial segregation, inadequate public
infrastructure, over-crowded and under-funded schools, lost open
space, environmental degradation, and unnecessarily high development
fees. The following section describes how different types of metropolitan
communities—from those in the core of a metropolitan area to those on its
fringes—are affected by the prevailing patterns of social separation and
sprawling development. 
ISOLATED INNER-CITY NEIGHBORHOODS
As metropolitan development moves outward, it leaves behind at the
core racially segregated, economically depressed neighborhoods. These
high-need neighborhoods are both a cause and a result of the complex
processes of social separation and sprawling development. The intense
needs and social problems related specifically to concentrated poverty
cause people to move outward from the core if they can afford to do so.
As a result of this outward movement, these already depressed neigh-
borhoods and their residents (increasingly those without residential
choices) grow continually more separated from the rest of the metro-
politan region.
As poverty concentrates and inner-city needs and problems intensify,
these communities become less desirable as places to live and work.
Meanwhile, communities without deep poverty develop in other areas of
the region—often at the edges. As a result, households are both “pushed”
out of inner-city neighborhoods and “pulled” into newer communities at
the edges of the region. They are pushed by problems associated with
increasingly poor schools, relatively weak property values, fear of
increasing crime, and inadequate public spending on basic services. 
At the same time, they are pulled by schools with fewer poor students,
new homes, and—at least initially—more open space. 
Ultimately, these disparities contribute to the isolation of inner-city
neighborhoods from the educational, employment, and social opportu-
nities available to residents in other parts of the region. This lack of oppor-
tunity can remain with the neighborhood for many years, passing from
one generation to the next. Even when individuals are able to overcome
these limitations, the neighborhoods they grew up in continue to grow
poorer because these successful individuals often choose to move away.  
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From the Core
to the Fringe
The Patterns of Social Separation
and Sprawl
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Such persistent poverty makes it extremely difficult to ever connect these
residents and their neighborhoods back into the metropolitan economy—
even in strong economic times.
OLDER COMMUNITIES IN DECLINE
The same patterns of metropolitan growth that lead to poor and isolated
central city neighborhoods also create significant fiscal and social stresses
in older communities beyond the borders of the region’s central city.
Generally, these communities are of two types: established suburbs just
outside of the central city and older satellite cities that are drawn increas-
ingly into the orbit of the metropolitan region as it expands outward.
While the social problems are generally not as severe in these cities as in
the poorest central-city neighborhoods, they exhibit signs of growing
instability and are at the greatest risk of experiencing rapid social decline.
Increasing concentrations of poverty in schools and neighborhoods, de-
creasing or stagnant home values, the loss of local businesses and jobs,
and the erosion of the local tax base are symptoms of this decline.
Young families with children are often the first to avoid or move away
from encroaching social problems. In most cases, the flight of these fami-
lies begins as regional development patterns cause poverty to increase in
local schools. As parents see increasing poverty in a community’s schools,
their perception of the community declines and they become less likely to
choose that community as a place to live. In a relatively short period,
demand for housing in these communities can drop significantly, followed
by declining home-sale prices and weakening retail markets—all of which
accelerate the transformation of these communities from relatively stable,
middle-class communities to communities in decline. 
Further, the housing markets and neighborhoods of these declining
communities can be much more fragile than those in the central cities
they surround. Lacking the many amenities of the central city—such as a
strong commercial and industrial base, unique older neighborhoods that 
can gentrify into valuable real es-
tate, a large police force, social wel-
fare agencies, diverse arts and cul-
ture—they often do not have the
resources to prevent social decline or
to regenerate once that decline has
occurred. The result is a spiraling
decline in the social and economic
stability of these communities. Over 
Sprawling development patterns have negative
consequences for central-city neighborhoods as well as
for developing communities on the metropolitan fringe.
The housing markets
and neighborhoods of
declining suburbs can
be much more fragile
than in the central
cities they surround.
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time, these cities are at risk of becoming just as isolated from the regional
economy as the depressed central-city neighborhoods.
FRINGE CITIES IN FISCAL STRESS
For developing communities, the effects of social separation and sprawl
are more fiscal than social. These fiscal effects, however, are intimately
related to the social decline of the central city and other communities.
Households with the financial ability to choose where they want to live are
unlikely to choose declining areas in the core of the region. Rather, they
often seek housing in less-developed communities—usually at the edge of
the region. A primary attraction of these less-developed communities is
the presence of schools with comparatively little poverty. Faced with this
growing demand, developing localities often struggle to provide the neces-
sary but expensive public infrastructure, such as roads, sewer systems,
and school buildings. 
The fact that many of these growing communities are primarily residen-
tial in nature tends to worsen the fiscal stress that they face. It is a general
rule of suburban fiscal planning that a tax base comprised solely or largely
of residential property is insufficient in itself to pay for the infrastructure
needed by a city or school district. Thus, many of these communities strug-
gle to provide expensive infrastructure on an inadequate tax base. 
Further, in an effort to increase tax revenues, developing localities compete
with other cities in the region for commercial and/or industrial properties that
can generate higher sales and property tax revenues. Incentives used in this
competition generally take the form of taxpayer-funded subsidies, tax incentives,
abatements, or complicated redevelopment
financing packages that are used to “bribe” busi-
nesses to locate within the community’s borders.
Often, these businesses have already decided to
locate somewhere in the region and are simply
looking for the best deal that a city will give them.
In other cases, the tax incentives and subsidies
have little effect on the business location decision
and represent unnecessary use of limited public
funds—funds that could be used to reduce taxes
or improve police and fire protection, libraries,
parks, and other city-provided services. 
CONGESTED EMPLOYMENT CENTERS
As employment centers expand outward from the traditional central busi-
ness district to other areas of the region, traffic congestion and the loss of
open spaces increase significantly. Generally, these outlying concentrations
of commercial and retail businesses are located in relatively affluent com-
munities, where purchasing power is high and expensive homes are avail-
able for company executives. In an effort to preserve the many advantages
of their affluence, these cities often zone their land in such a way as to pre-
vent the construction of a broader range of housing choices that would
allow greater socioeconomic diversity. 
Despite their strong position relative to other communities in the
region, these cities also face problems in preserving and maintaining the
amenities that made them so desirable in the first place. As Joel Garreau
suggests in his book Edge Cities, these places soon become as “urban” as
the communities that their residents were attempting to avoid. Because of
the concentration of retail and offices in the area, local roadways become
extremely congested with employees and shoppers. Also, as property in
these cities attracts even more executive homes or office and retail build-
ings, open spaces are threatened and soon lost. Because of the affluence
and relative power of the citizenry who live in them, these are often the first
communities to actively fight urban sprawl—passing local laws that limit
development and/or purchasing open spaces in the area for public parks.
On a regional level, exclusive zoning and unilateral development limits
can contribute greatly to social separation and sprawling development. A
mismatch between where people work and where they live emerges, with
employees commuting both into and out of the area. The result of this
mismatch is significant roadway congestion throughout the region, which
increases the time wasted in traffic jams and reduces the quality of life.
Further, the congestion near these employment centers often means that
the majority of the region’s highway spending is used to expand the com-
muting corridors serving these centers—which, ironically, often results in
even more development and traffic congestion. Unilateral attempts in
these places to slow the pace of this development through local moratori-
ums may make the local citizens feel as if they are doing something to
fight sprawl.  In reality however, these local actions only serve to throw
development farther out into the fringes of the region, eventually making
the problems worse.
Many growing
fringe communities
struggle to 
provide expensive 
infrastructure 
on an inadequate
tax base.
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he Los Angeles region is the second most populous
metropolitan area in the country. In 1998, the entire metropoli-
tan area contained nearly 15.2 million people, as well as 177
cities, 209 school districts, and an urbanized area that encom-
passes more than 3,000 square miles—larger than Delaware and
Rhode Island combined. Since 1990, the region has absorbed over
1.2 million people—more than any other metropolitan area in the country.
In some ways, the development patterns that contributed to these con-
ditions in the Los Angeles region are unlike many older regions of the
country. While Mid-
western and northeastern
cities tended to develop
radially along streetcar
corridors, Los Angeles’s
development patterns
were based more on the
automobile and freeway.4
And while most metro-
politan areas are defined
by their central city, the
Los Angeles region is
more accurately
described as having mul-
tiple centers. In The
Reluctant Metropolis,
William Fulton has writ-
ten of the reluctance of
people in the region to
associate themselves with the City of Los Angeles, choosing instead to
identify with places such as Orange County, the San Fernando Valley, or
San Bernardino.
Despite all of these differences in the physical patterns of develop-
ment in the Los Angeles region, the impacts on the social landscape are
not much different from those seen in other metropolitan areas of the
country. In some ways, they are much worse. Severe poverty and racial
segregation is concentrated in neighborhoods and schools at the core of
the region and in outlying satellite cities. Significant fiscal disparities exist
among the region’s cities, school districts, and counties. Traffic conges-
tion in the region is worse than in any other metropolitan area.5
Competition among cities for sales tax revenue wastes millions of valu-
able tax dollars and encourages sprawl. Growing communities at the
edges of the region are struggling with overcrowded schools and inade-
quate infrastructure—a situation made even worse the in Los Angeles
region because of California’s property tax system (see page 19).
As social separation and sprawl continue to fragment the Los Angeles
region along lines of class and race and spread urban development into the
surrounding landscape, it is important to look broadly at the social, eco-
nomic, and environmental effects of these patterns. More specifically, it is
important to know how the benefits and costs of current policies and
trends are distributed throughout the region. For instance, as the Los
Angeles region expands geographically, what effect does this have on older
cities? How do public investments in highways and other development
affect patterns of growth and contribute to urban sprawl? Do local tax poli-
cies tend to support separation and sprawl or work to prevent them? These
are some of the questions that this report attempts to address and bring to
the forefront of public policy discussions in the Los Angeles region.
Poverty and racial segregation are concentrated
in neighborhoods and schools at the core of the region.
Social Separation and Sprawl
in the Los Angeles Region
T
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ne of the most devastating consequences of social 
separation and sprawl is the emergence of highly 
concentrated neighborhoods of poverty at the region’s core.
The profound lack of educational and economic opportuni-
ty created by extreme social isolation intensifies flight from
affected neighborhoods and dramatically decreases the 
quality of life for those left behind.
Urban scholars classify neighborhoods with more than 40 percent of
residents in poverty as high-poverty tracts or ghettos, barrios, or slums 
(depending on the racial composition of the neighborhood).
6
Between
1970 and 1990, a time of national economic prosperity, the number of
poor persons living in high-poverty neighborhoods in the United States
nearly doubled.   
For the residents and children left behind in these increasingly poor
communities—disproportionately those who are Hispanic or black—the
result of these patterns is isolation from the educational and economic
opportunities that will help them succeed later in life. This is because
schools and neighborhoods represent a series of reinforcing social net-
works that contribute to success or failure.
7
Neighborhoods and schools
that are not overwhelmed with the social challenges of highly concentrat-
ed poverty become streams flowing in the direction of success, moved for-
ward by currents that value hard work, goal-setting, and academic
achievement.
8
By contrast, in places where the concentration of poverty
intensifies social and economic problems become streams moving toward
failure, with currents that reinforce anti-social behavior, drifting, teenage
pregnancy, and dropping out of school.
9
Outside of Appalachia, there are few densely poor white neighborhoods
in America. In a typical metro area in 1990, only about 26 percent of poor
whites lived in poor neighborhoods.
10
However, 54 percent of poor Hispanic
persons and 75 percent of black persons lived in poor neighborhoods.  As
David Rusk has written, “For the great majority of poor whites...poverty is an
individual household condition. Most poor whites are not surrounded by
other poor people. For most poor blacks, and, to a lesser degree, for poor
Hispanics, poverty is a communal crisis, as well as an individual hardship.”11
Racial discrimination in the housing market is a fundamental ingredi-
ent in the creation of neighborhoods of concentrated poverty. Various
studies have shown that housing discrimination on the basis of race takes
place at every point of the renting or home-buying process—from the
time a black or Hispanic calls a real estate agent to the time he or she
applies for a mortgage. According to a summary index created as part of a
national housing discrimination survey, the probability of a black or
Hispanic person experiencing some form of discrimination during a hous-
ing or rental search is approximately 50 percent.12
Where the Poor
Get Poorer
Concentrated Poverty at the Core
The concentration of poverty in core neighborhoods
of Los Angeles has contributed to devastating social
upheavals such as the 1992 riots.
O
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7he effects of concentrated pov-
erty on people who live in such
neighborhoods can be extremely
debilitating. Stimulated by William
Julius Wilson’s book The Truly
Disadvantaged, scholars in the late
1980s began actively studying the
effects of concentrated poverty in metropolitan
areas. Their research confirms that concentrated
poverty multiplies the severity of problems faced
by both communities and poor indi-
viduals.13 As neighborhoods become
dominated by joblessness, racial seg-
regation, and single-parentage, they
become isolated from middle-class
society and the private economy.14
Individuals, particularly children, are
deprived of local successful role mod-
els and connections to opportunity
outside the neighborhood. The fear of
crime and violence becomes part of
everyday life. Further, concentrated
poverty among adults and children
has been associated with poor health
and a higher incidence of disease.15
Other studies have found that
poor individuals living in concentrat-
ed poverty are far more likely to become preg-
nant as teenagers, drop out of high school, and
remain jobless than poor people living in more
socially mixed neighborhoods.16 Similarly, the
concentration of poverty and its attendant
social isolation leads to the development of
speech patterns increasingly distinct from
mainstream English.17 These speech differences
make education, job searches, and general
interaction with mainstream society difficult.18
The effects of concentrated poverty can be
seen by comparing the experience of the poor
living in concentrated poverty to that of poor
individuals living in mixed-income communi-
ties. At least one large social experiment
demonstrates that when poor individuals are
freed from poor neighborhoods and provided
with opportunities, their lives can change quite
dramatically. Under a 1976 court order in the
fair-housing lawsuit of Hills v. Gautreaux,19
thousands of single-parent black families living
in Chicago public housing have been provided
housing opportunities in predominantly white
middle-class suburbs. By random assignment
more than half of these households moved to
affluent suburbs that were more than 96 per-
cent white, while the other participants moved
to neighborhoods that were poor and more
than 90 percent black. The pool of Gautreaux
families thus provides a strong sample to study
the effects of suburban housing opportunities
on very poor city residents.
James Rosenbaum and colleagues from
Northwestern University have intensively stud-
ied the Gautreaux families.20 Their research has
established that the low-income women who
moved to the suburbs “clearly experi-
enced improved employment and
earnings, even though the program
provided no job training or placement
services.” 21 Very rapidly after the
moves, the suburbanites were about 13
percent more likely to be employed.22
Rosenbaum also found that the chil-
dren of the suburban movers dropped
out of high school less frequently than
the city movers (5 percent vs. 20 per-
cent) and maintained similar grades
despite higher standards in suburban
schools. They also were significantly
more likely to be on a college track (40.3
percent vs. 23.5 percent) and to actual-
ly attend college (54 percent vs. 21 per-
cent).  In terms of employment, 75 percent of
the suburban youth had jobs compared to 41
percent in the city. Moreover, the suburban
youth had a significant advantage in job pay
and were more likely to have a prestigious job
with benefits. Overall, 90 percent of the subur-
ban youth were either working or in school,
compared with 74 percent of the city youth.23
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8Concentrated Poverty
Data Source:
1980 U.S. Census of
Population and Housing
Summary Tape File 3A
Note:  
Census tracts with 
“No data” either had 
suppression of data on
total persons in poverty 
or else had fewer than 50
total persons for whom
poverty status was 
determined in 1980.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).
Percentage Persons in Poverty by Census Tract, 1980
Percentage Persons
in Poverty
Regional Value:  11.8 %
Data from the 1980 census shows that the major-
ity of neighborhoods where more than 20 percent of  the
people lived in poverty were concentrated in Los Angeles
and the older  cities to its east, such as Bell, Bell Gardens,
Cudahy, Huntington Park, Compton, and Inglewood.
High-poverty tracts (those where the poverty rate  exceed-
ed 40 percent) were centered mostly in small pockets of
eastern and  south-central Los Angeles. Outside of the
immediate Los Angeles area, pockets of  poor neighbor-
hoods were found primarily in older satellite cities,
including San Bernardino, Long Beach, Ontario, and
Montclair. Overall, 40 percent of all  people living in pover-
ty in the Los Angeles region lived in neighborhoods with a
poverty rate of at least 20 percent.
Poverty Deepens and Expands in the Heart of the Region
Percentage Persons in Poverty by Census Tract, 1990
Data Source:
1990 U.S. Census of
Population and Housing
Summary Tape File 3A
Note:  
Census tracts with “No
data” had fewer than 
50 total persons for 
whom poverty status 
was determined in 1990.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).
During the 1980s, the number of people living in
poverty throughout the Los Angeles region increased by
more than 350,000 people—an increase of nearly 42 per-
cent. A disproportionate amount of this increase (65 per-
cent) was concentrated in many of the same neighbor-
hoods that were burdened with high poverty in 1980.
Overall, the percentage of the region’s poor living in neigh-
borhoods with a poverty rate of at least 20 percent grew
from 40 to 48 percent—evidence that poverty became even
more concentrated during the 1980s. The number of tracts
with a poverty rate of at least 40 percent grew significantly as
well, spreading outward into surrounding neighborhoods.
More recent data of elementary school poverty suggest that
the expansion of high-poverty neighborhoods in the core of
the region has continued throughout the 1990s, despite
strong economic growth in the latter half of the decade. 
Percentage Persons
in Poverty
Regional Value:  13.1%
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he social decline seen in inner-city neighborhoods is most
likely to spread to communities where the middle-class chooses
not to live. When middle-class presence declines, there is a grow-
ing risk that these places and their residents will be isolated from
the growth and investment occurring elsewhere in the region. 
Growing poverty in local schools represents a powerful nega-
tive prophecy for cities. In the Los Angeles region there has been tremendous
growth in student poverty in stressed core communities, such as Bellflower,
Anaheim, and Whittier. Generally, families with choices will seek the least
poor school district in which they can afford to live. As demand for middle-
class housing begins to lag, housing prices fall behind areas with low poverty
in their schools. This accelerates the decline, since individuals and business-
es with choices available to them tend to look for places with the strongest
appreciation in prices. Because of discrimination in the housing market,
schools in the declining communities often see a rise in the number of
minority students as the rate of student poverty increases.
While an increasing concentration of poverty is a sign of growing stress
for a community, high crime rates often signal that a community has 
already experienced significant social decline. This can be seen in the 
Los Angeles region, where the highest rates of crime tend to be found in the
poorest and most economically depressed communities—both at the core
of the region and in older satellite cities. These places are also among those
with the most limited resources to provide adequate police protection.
When a community experiences high or increasing rates of crime, middle-
class families are likely to move away to other communities—just as they
tend to do when poverty increases in their local schools. This flight further
reduces the resources and stability required to address the increased crime
and effectively reduce it.
Cities In Decline
Disinvestment and Middle-Class Flight
As growing poverty in
local schools pushes
families away from
older communities,
their housing 
values decline.
T
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here is a broadly shared illusion
that the civil rights movement of
the 1960s solved the problem of racial
segregation in this country. However,
residential patterns remain highly 
segregated for blacks and Hispanics.
Further, recent evidence indicates that
segregation is actually increasing in U.S. schools,
particularly for black and Hispanic students.
The tables below show that by 1996, Hispanic
students attended schools that were poorer and
less white than schools attended by any other
racial group. Black students were similarly 
segregated in terms of both race and poverty.
Asian students, by contrast, attended schools
that were much less segregated than their
Hispanic and black counterparts. 
Source: U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil
Rights and NCES Common Core of Data Public School
Universe. Tables from Gary Orfield and John T. Yun,
“Resegregation in American Schools,” (The Civil Rights
Project: Harvard University, 1999).
Note: Percent poor signifies the proportion of students
receiving free or reduced price lunches because of low
family income.
Native 
White Black    Hispanic      Asian         American
Student          Student          Student Student Student
% White 81.2 32.6 29.9 46.9 49.2
% Black 8.6 54.5 11.8 12.1 6.7
% Hispanic 6.6 9.8 52.5 18.5 9.1
% Asian 2.8 2.7 5.0 21.8 2.3
% Native American 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.7 32.7
% Poor (of any race) 18.7 42.7 46.0 29.3 30.9
Racial Composition and Poverty Status of Schools
Attended by Average Student, 
by Race 1996-1997
Segregation is increasing in schools
attended by Hispanic children.
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Data Source:
Free and reduced-cost
meals data and total
enrollment figures
provided by the
California Department
of Education.
Note:  
School districts with
“No data” had fewer 
than 50 elementary
students in 1996.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).
Percentage of Elementary Students Eligible for Free and Reduced-cost Meals by School District, 1996
Of the nearly 1.5 million elementary
students in the 165 school districts of the Los
Angeles region in 1996, 61 percent of stu-
dents were eligible for free or reduced-cost
meals. This represents a far greater percent-
age than is found in California as a whole
(about 47 percent of California students are
eligible for free or reduced-cost lunches).
In 1996, 83 percent of the elementary school
students in the Los Angeles Unified School
District qualified for reduced-cost meals. High
rates of student poverty were also found in the
older communities of southeast Los Angeles
County, including the Compton (88 percent),
Montebello (79 percent), and Long Beach (76
percent) school districts. Other districts with
poverty rates above 75 percent could be found
in the San Gabriel Valley and near San
Bernardino, Palm Springs, and Adelanto.
Percentage Eligible
Regional Value:  60.6%
Poverty in Schools
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Change in Percentage of Elementary Students Eligible for Free and Reduced-cost Meals by School District, 1988-1996
Nearly all of the school districts that saw
the fastest increase in elementary school stu-
dent poverty between 1988 and 1996 were
located in the older core communities east of
Los Angeles or in low tax-capacity areas of San
Bernardino and Riverside Counties. For many
of these districts, such as Hawthorne (32 to 86
percent), Anaheim (19 to 79), and Buena Park
(29 to 61), student poverty in 1988 was already
higher than the regional average, signifying an
increasing concentration of poverty in the
region. For somewhat less distressed districts,
such as Orange (21 to 43), Downey (21 to 53),
and Apple Valley (30 to 57), the recent increases
in student poverty may signal the beginning
stages of increasing social stress and the down-
ward spiral of flight and disinvestment.
Change in % Points
Regional Value:  +16.3
An Increase in Poor Students Can Signal Decline
Data Source:
Free and reduced-cost
meals data and total
enrollment figures
provided by the
California Department
of Education.
Note:  
School districts with
“No data” did not
have data available
for 1988.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).
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Data Source:
Racial data and total
enrollment figures 
provided by the
California Department
of Education.
Note:  
School districts marked 
“No data” had fewer
than 50 elementary
students in 1996.
* Asian and Native
American students 
are not included in this
analysis because they
tend to experience 
less educational and
housing segregation
than do Hispanic and
black students 
(see p. 11).
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).
Segregation in the housing market
is placing Hispanic and black students of the
Los Angeles region in densely poor schools with
severely limited educational opportunities.
While blacks have long lived in highly segregat-
ed conditions in California, the segregation of
Hispanics has increased significantly in recent
years. In 1970, Hispanic children attended
California schools with an average of 54 per-
cent white enrollment. But by 1996, they were
in schools where the average white enrollment
had plummeted to under 24 percent.24
Overall, 61 percent of elementary students
in the Los Angeles region in 1996 were
Hispanic or black. School districts with espe-
cially high rates of Hispanic and black students
were almost exclusively located in economical-
ly depressed communities located just to the
south and east of Los Angeles. These included
Compton (99 percent), Inglewood (98 percent),
Lennox (97 percent), and Montebello (93 per-
cent). Districts with extremely low rates of
Hispanic and black students were found in
more affluent districts of the region, including
Las Virgenes (7 percent), Beverly Hills (6 per-
cent), Palos Verdes Peninsula (5 percent), and
La Canada (3 percent).
% Hispanic and Black
Regional Value:  61.0%
Racial Segregation in Schools
Percentage of Hispanic and Black Elementary Students by School District, 1996*
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Change in Percentage of Hispanic and Black Elementary Students by School District, 1986-1996*
As a whole, the percentage of Hispanic and
black elementary students in the Los Angeles
region increased from 52 to 61 percent between
1986 and 1996. Over one-third of the growth in
Hispanic and black elementary students
throughout the region occurred in just 33 of the
region’s 165 school districts—most of which were
located in the core of the region and all of which
had above average student poverty in 1986. This
suggests an increasing concentration of Hispanic
and black elementary students in poor schools.
Especially large increases could be found in
the core districts of Downey (33 to 68 percent)
and Bellflower (24 to 55 percent). Significant
increases also occurred in the increasingly poor
outlying districts of Mountain View (27 to 58
percent) and Fontana (41 to 77 percent) in San
Bernardino County, Moreno Valley (28 to 59
percent) in Riverside County, and Palmdale (21
to 54 percent) and Eastside Union (17 to 50 per-
cent) in northern Los Angeles County.
Change in % Points
Regional Value:  +9.2
Black and Hispanic Students are Increasingly Isolated
Data Source:
Racial data and total
enrollment figures 
provided by the
California Department
of Education.
Note:  
Districts marked 
“No Data” had fewer
than 50 elementary
students in 1986 
or 1996.
* Asian and Native
American students 
are not included in this
analysis because they
tend to experience
less educational and
housing segregation
than do Hispanic and
black students 
(see p. 11).
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).
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Part I Crimes per 100,000 Population by Police Jurisdiction, 1996
Overall, Part I crimes (which include both
property and violent crimes) in the region were
measured at 5,120 crimes per 100,000 persons in
1996. Higher than average Part I crime rates
could generally be found in Los Angeles and in
cities south and east of the city. A substantial
number of cities in San Bernardino and Riverside
counties also had relatively high crime rates. 
Many of these high-crime cities have a rela-
tively low tax base from which to provide ade-
quate police services; these include Bellflower
(6,376 crimes per 100,000 persons), Ontario
(6,348), and Redlands (5,522). The communi-
ties with the lowest crime rates were concen-
trated in relatively affluent areas—including
the San Fernando Valley and Simi Hills area,
southern Orange County, and the Palos Verdes
area. These cities include Thousand Oaks
(2,345 crimes per 100,000 persons), Mission
Viejo (2,230), and Palos Verdes Estates (1,352).
Crime Rates
Data Source:
California State
Department of Justice,
California and FBI Crime
Indexes, 1996
Note:  
Part I crimes as 
defined by the FBI
include murder, rape,
robbery, aggravated
assault, burglary, theft,
auto theft, and arson.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).
Crimes per
100,000 Persons
Regional Value:  5,120.2
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Percentage Change in Part I Crimes per Capita by Police Jurisdiction, 1986-1996
Data Source:
California State
Department of
Justice, California
and FBI Crime
Indexes, 1986 and
1996
Note:  
Part I crimes as
defined by the FBI
include murder, rape,
robbery, aggravated
assault, burglary,
theft, auto theft, and
arson.
Note:  
Jurisdictions with 
“No data” did not
exist in 1986.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).
Between 1986 and 1996, the per capita
Part I crime rate for the entire Los Angeles
region declined by 28 percent—from 7,111 to
5,120 crimes per 100,000 residents. This mirrors
a national pattern correlated to dramatic
employment growth. The small number of
cities that actually saw increases in their crime
rates tended to be cities with low tax bases con-
centrated southeast of Los Angeles. These
included the communities of Bellflower (rising
from 5,407 to 6,376 Part I crimes per 100,000
residents), Norwalk (4,325 to 4,436), and
Lakewood (4,937 to 4,988). 
On the positive side, a number of relatively
poor communities, such as Santa Ana (8,746 to
4,433), Orange (6,462 to 3,435), and Garden
Grove (7,208 to 4,296) saw significant declines
in their crime rates. Still, a clear pattern
emerges, where cities with the most significant
rates in crime are centered in the poorest and
most economically depressed areas while more
affluent areas enjoy relatively low crime rates.
Percentage Change
Regional Value:  -28.0%
High Crime Rates Can Be a Sign of Community Decline
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any of the cities in the Los Angeles region faced with
large and growing spending needs also have a compara-
tively small tax base from which to generate revenue.
Given California’s limitations on property tax rates (see
facing page), these cities are forced to look for additional
sources of revenue, such as development fees. In many
cases, however, these alternative sources of revenue are so limited that
cities are forced to reduce or eliminate basic public services.25
In the Los Angeles region, as with other regions throughout the coun-
try, cities with low property and sales tax bases also tend to be burdened
with a disproportionate number of factors that make providing public
services especially costly—poor school-age children, high crime rates, or
significant population growth and rapidly increasing school enrollments.
More affluent areas with high tax bases, on the other hand, tend to not be
burdened by these factors and are thus better able to provide quality
public services without having to search for alternative sources of rev-
enue. When a school district experiences significant growth in its stu-
dent enrollment over a relatively short period of time, its costs of ade-
quately serving those students tend to increase. These costs generally
relate to new infrastructure needs, such as building schools. Spending
on these infrastructure needs can limit the amount of money that is
available for other education-related needs, such as teachers, books, or
other resources.
Significant population growth in a city over a short time period also
increases the costs of infrastructure and other public services—especially
if the growth was not expected and planned for ahead of time. Many of
these costs relate to the initial construction costs associated with new
roads, sewer lines, parks, and other infrastructure. When these costs rise, it
prevents a city or county from spending that money on other valuable
public services.
Growing Pains
Struggling to Maintain an Adequate Local Tax Base
With rapid population
growth comes major
infrastructure needs–
expenses that many 
growing communities 
can ill afford.
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Ventura County
San Bernadino
County
Riverside County
Orange County
Los Angeles County
Percent change in population, by county: 1986-1996
M
10% 10%
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43%
33%
Source: Population Estimates Program, Population Division,
U.S. Census Bureau
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efore 1978, local governments
in California were able to tax
property within their borders at
whatever rate was necessary to
provide desired services. Cities,
counties, school districts, and
other taxing entities could
decide each year how much revenue they
would need to provide the services that their
residents desired, and set their tax rates
accordingly. But in the late 1970s, rapidly esca-
lating property values (without commensurate
reductions in tax rates) led to a property tax
revolt that precipitated state action.
With the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978,
control over property tax rates and revenues
was shifted to the state—significantly reduc-
ing the amount of property tax revenues avail-
able to local governments as well as their flex-
ibility in providing varying levels of public
services. Statewide, the passage of Proposition
13 resulted in a decrease of $6.8 billion in local
property tax revenues (57 percent) between
1975-76 and 1993-94.26 Major changes that
occurred as a result of Proposition 13 include: 
Changes in  Assessment
Procedures—
The value of property for taxing purposes shift-
ed from an estimate of “fair market value” to
the actual “acquisition value.” In other words, a
property’s value for tax purposes is equal to the
price paid for it at the time of sale. Until the
property is re-sold, the assessed value of the
property is allowed to rise no more than two
percent each year. When the property is sold
again, the assessed value becomes the new
sale price. 
Limitations on the
Property Tax Rate—
Proposition 13 limited the property tax rate to no
more than 1 percent of assessed value (excep-
tions are allowed for the payment of voter-
approved general obligation
debt or pre-1978 government
employee retirement plans.)
Prior to 1978, local property
tax rates in California aver-
aged about 2.7 percent—
nearly three times that al-
lowed after Proposition 13.
Allocation of
Property Tax Revenues—
Revenues collected on prop-
erty in a county are distrib-
uted back to the local units of
government within that
county by a state-determined
formula. This formula effec-
tively locks in the relative dis-
tribution of property tax revenues that
existed in 1978, just before Proposition 13
was passed. Statewide, cities receive an aver-
age of only 11 percent of total property tax 
revenues. Counties receive about 19 percent,
school districts 52 percent, and other local
entities 18 percent. 
The impact of Proposition 13 on local prop-
erty tax revenues and local flexibility in provid-
ing services has been profound. Without the
ability to set their own tax rates, local units of
government are constrained in their ability to
respond to the desires of their citizens for pub-
lic services or the need for redevelopment.
Further, dependence on alternative sources of
revenue has increased. These sources often
include development fees (such as charges for
the cost of extending
sewers) that increase the
cost of new housing, or
the sales tax, which is
often the object of waste-
ful competition among
cities (see page 27).
All of these effects of
Proposition 13 tend to
disadvantage low-income,
developed communities
already experiencing so-
cial decline. With the
state-mandated limita-
tions on tax rates and lit-
tle ability to generate rev-
enue from other sources,
these localities face sig-
nificant burdens in trying to reverse the cycle
of decline. Most simply fall further behind the
other cities, counties, and school districts in
the region. Thus, while the overall effect of
Proposition 13 and other tax limitations con-
tinues to be debated, it has more likely con-
tributed to social separation than helped to
alleviate it.
The passage of
Proposition 13
resulted in a 
57 percent
decrease in
local property
tax revenue.
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Assessed Property Value per Household by Municipality and County Unincorporated Area, 1996
The lowest property values (and thus,
the lowest property tax base) per household in
1996 could be found almost entirely in outlying
areas of San Bernardino and Riverside counties
and in the core cities of southeast Los Angeles
County, where property is primarily residential in
nature and social stress is increasing. By contrast,
above-average property values could be found
mostly in the growing, affluent communities of
southern Orange County and Ventura County. 
Overall, assessed property values in the Los
Angeles region were measured at $168,382 per
household in 1996. Two-thirds of the region’s
households live in communities where proper-
ty values are below average. Especially low
property tax bases per household were found in
outlying satellite communities such as San
Bernardino ($61,924), Barstow ($65,526), and
Twentynine Palms ($71,618) in San Bernardino
County. The older, declining core cities of
Inglewood ($98,795), Bellflower ($90,235),
Maywood ($72,135), and Cudahy ($68,685) also
had low property tax bases.  Cities with proper-
ty tax bases per household that were well above
average included Laguna Hills ($681,456),
Irvine ($340,486), Arcadia ($234,492), and
Moorpark ($230,177).
Property Value per Household
Regional Value:  $168,382
Revenue Factor: Property Tax Base
Data Source:
California State Controller’s
Office; Los Angeles County
Auditor-Controller; Orange
County Auditor-Controller;
Riverside County Assessor;
San Bernardino County
Auditor/Controller-Recorder;
Ventura County Assessor
(tax base data); California
Department of Finance,
Demographic Research Unit
(1996 household 
estimates)
Note:  
Municipalities with 
“No data” had fewer than
50 households in 1996.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area Research
Corporation (MARC).
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Taxable Sales Transactions per Household by Municipality and County Unincorporated Area, 1996
Localities with the lowest taxable
sales transactions per household in 1996 were
spread throughout the region. In some of these
communities, a significant property tax base
compensates for the low sales tax base. There
are however, a number of cities—particularly
stressed core communities in southeast Los
Angeles County—that have neither an ade-
quate property nor an adequate sales tax base. 
In 1996, taxable transactions in the Los
Angeles region were measured at $28,505 per
household. Stressed core cities with low sales
tax bases included Inglewood ($17,162),
Temple City ($13,123), San Marino ($8,470),
and Sierra Madre ($3,476). A number of high-
income cities with few social stresses, such as
Palos Verdes Estates ($3,802), La Habra Heights
($2,524), and Chino Hills ($6,664), also had low
sales tax bases. However, the high property tax
base in these cities more than makes up for the
lack of a sales tax base.
Places with particularly high sales tax bases
tended to be located in commercial centers of
Orange County, the San Gabriel Valley, and
western Riverside County. These included
Cerritos ($129,040), Beverly Hills ($96,745),
Irvine ($69,245), and El Segundo ($64,701). 
Transactions per
Household
Regional Value:  $28,505
Revenue Factor: Sales Tax Base
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Growth in Elementary Student Enrollment by School District, 1988-1996
Overall, the number of students enrolled in
elementary schools across the region increased
by more than 255,000 students between 1988
and 1996—an increase of nearly 21 percent.
About 56 percent of the region’s districts with
elementary students grew at a rate exceeding
the regional average. Most of these were out-
side of the immediate core area.
Some of the most significant percentage
increases in elementary student populations
took place in the Antelope Valley of northern
Los Angeles County and in Riverside County,
areas where the local tax capacity to fund
school construction is comparatively small.
School districts with particularly high percent-
age increases over the period included Murietta
Valley (which increased by nearly 350 percent),
Perris (83 percent), and Coachella Valley (42
percent). Districts closer to the core that grew
significantly were Santa Ana (69 percent) and
Anaheim (41 percent).
Cost Factor: School Enrollment
Data Source:
Total enrollment figures 
provided by the California
Department of Education.
Note:  
Districts with “No data” 
had fewer than 
50 elementary students 
in 1988.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area Research
Corporation (MARC).
Percentage Change
Regional Value:  20.7%
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Growth in Population by Municipality, 1986-1996
Data Source:
California Department of
Finance, Demographic
Research Unit (1986 and
1996 population estimates)
Note:  
Municipalities with 
“No data” did not exist 
in 1986.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).
The population of the Los Angeles region
grew by 16 percent between 1986 and 1996, gain-
ing more than 2.1 million people. The largest per-
centage increases in population took place in
Riverside and San Bernardino counties, which
grew by 62 and 46 percent, respectively. Overall,
nearly 69 percent of the region’s population
growth took place outside of Los Angeles County.
Most of the fastest growth in the region was
located in communities where the tax base is
relatively low and where expensive infrastruc-
ture investments would be needed. The rela-
tively small tax base in these cities makes it dif-
ficult to pay for necessary infrastructure with-
out state assistance, burdensome development
fees, or wasteful efforts to attract retail proper-
ties and the sales tax revenue they provide.
Among these fast-growing, low tax-capacity
cities were Palmdale (which grew by 317 per-
cent), San Jacinto (124 percent), and Moreno
Valley (101 percent).
Cost Factor: Population Growth
Percentage Change
Regional Value:  18.3 %
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he previous sections of this report have discussed how social
separation and sprawl affect specific cities and other local juris-
dictions in the Los Angeles region. However, there are many
effects that are not so easily assigned to specific local govern-
ments or their property owners and residents. In fact, many of
the negative aspects of social separation and sprawl impact the
entire region. Some of these—such as traffic congestion and poor air qual-
ity—are readily apparent. Others are not so obvious, such as when local
governments favor land uses that generate high tax revenues over more
beneficial uses. This section describes several factors that contribute to
the more generalized effects that are detrimental to the economy and
quality of life throughout the region.
FISCAL ZONING AND COMPETITION FOR TAX BASE 
Land-use decisions and the amount and quality of public services provid-
ed by cities and counties are often significantly influenced by the amount
of local tax revenue that is available. This reality forces local jurisdictions
to compete for commercial properties, high-valued homes, and office
parks, and prevent land uses that generate less revenue but require more
city services, such as lower-valued homes or apartments.27 This process is
known as “fiscal zoning.” Because there is only a limited supply of these
“good” land uses, it is inevitable that a small number of cities will win the
competition while the greater majority will lose, leading to significant fis-
cal disparities. Further, the land uses that generate the most revenue are
not necessarily those that provide the greatest long-term benefit for the
city and its residents, or for the region as a whole.
This competition, as many critics suggest, creates a number of undesir-
able consequences. First, wealthy jurisdictions with large tax bases have
an advantage over less affluent localities in attracting desired land uses,
since individuals and businesses will typically choose to locate in places
where the population is generally wealthy and quality services are provid-
ed. This leads to a concentration of revenue-generating land uses and
their benefits in relatively few localities. Conversely, places with the great-
est need for additional revenues to address social and economic problems
are at a disadvantage when competing for revenue-generating property,
which leads to further social separation. Lastly, competition forces locali-
ties to abandon long-range planning as they struggle to attract certain
properties before they go elsewhere. This leads to poorly planned, sprawl-
ing development that destroys open spaces and causes fiscal stress.
In the Los Angeles region, the clearest motivator of fiscal zoning is the
sales tax. Because of limitations imposed on property tax revenue by
Proposition 13, the sales tax has taken on increased importance to local
officials seeking to increase their overall tax revenues, and has become a
focal point for competition. Efforts by cities to attract large retail develop-
ments by offering tax breaks, subsidies, and expensive infrastructure
improvements has resulted in the wasteful use of public funds (see box 
on page 27).
JOBS/HOUSING MISMATCH AND TRAFFIC CONGESTION 
In many regions, office parks and retail centers outside of the core now
absorb a greater share of employment growth than do the traditional
central-city employment centers. Many of these jobs are relatively low-
paying and low-skilled jobs, especially in the retail businesses that are so
highly sought after by California cities. Since many of the employees
who fill these jobs cannot afford to live in the executive housing that sur-
rounds these employment centers, they must commute from other areas
of the region. For those who are the poorest and most in need of the
jobs, it may be very difficult to find transportation to these employment
centers. In this sense, the decentralization of employment dispropor-
tionately affects poor, inner-city residents and further isolates them from
A Web of Worries
Regional Effects of 
Social Separation 
and Sprawl
T
Photo credit: Spencer Grant/PhotoEdit 
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employment opportunities.28 This phenomenon is often referred to as a
“spatial mismatch” between jobs and housing.29
To the extent that workers can get to the jobs, this mismatch between
affordable housing and employment opportunities often contributes to
extreme congestion at the peak hours of commuting. Further, as develop-
ment intensifies in the vicinity of these satellite employment centers, traffic
congestion caused by commuters and shoppers increases very quickly. Thus,
decentralized employment centers can lead not only to the loss of valuable
open space, but also to the loss of time spent on congested freeways.
INEFFECTIVE AND INEQUITABLE HIGHWAY SPENDING
Public investments in a metropolitan transportation network—and where
such investments take place—can have a significant effect on the degree
of social separation and sprawl that a metropolitan region experiences. In
the Los Angeles region, imbalanced investments in the regional trans-
portation network have contributed to the social separation and econom-
ic decline of many core communities while benefiting areas such as
southern Orange County and Ventura County. The increasingly isolated
communities at the core of the region bear the costs of transportation
investments but experience little, if any, benefit from the economic devel-
opment that it promotes.
Spending on new highway construction, lane widening, and other
improvements frequently targets areas where highway congestion is
increasing. This congestion is often caused in part by the fragmented
parochial land use pattern in which developing communities compete for
jobs and expensive housing. However,
because transportation planning typically
focuses only on congestion, without
addressing these other important factors
that cause congestion, major expenditures
often have little effect on the problems they
were designed to counter. According to a
recent study of congestion by the Texas
Transportation Institute, traffic congestion
in the Los Angeles region has steadily wors-
ened between 1982 and 1997—and this
region continues to have the worst overall
congestion in the nation.30 Further, a companion study by the Surface
Transportation Policy Project (STPP) suggests that expanding road capacity
does little to reduce congestion in the long term.31 According to the STPP
report, even as the Los Angeles region has expanded the number of freeway
lane-miles in its urbanized areas by 54 percent (1,840 lane-miles), the aver-
age peak travel speed on these freeways has dropped by more than 14 per-
cent, from 42 to 36 mph. It suggests that these new freeways fail to reduce
congestion because the expanded capacity encourages more people to
drive. Moreover, these freeway investments, by spurring developments that
exclude the less affluent, can act to further increase the social isolation of
poor communities already falling behind the rest of the region.
Expenditures on 
new highway 
construction often 
have little effect on 
the problems they are
intended to counter.
26 Photo credit: Sibylla Allgaier/Heliphoto
LOSS OF OPEN SPACE AND FARMLAND
The loss of open space and agricultural land has become an important
concern in California and the Los Angeles region. The creation of the
California Coastal Commission in the 1970s to control growth and protect
coastal areas was an early example. More recently, local growth-control
initiatives have become major issues at all levels of government—especial-
ly in the fastest growing areas.32 For instance, citizens of Ventura County,
one of these rapidly growing areas, recently supported growth controls by
voting to prohibit the rezoning of agricultural land in unincorporated
areas for the next 20 years without voter approval.33
In some communities, attempts are made to reduce the environmental 
and social impacts caused by the loss of agricultural land and open
space—usually in the form of limits on the amount of development that is
allowed or tax referenda that approve the purchase of lands for open
spaces or parks. By themselves however, these communities cannot affect
the conversion of land to urban uses at a regional level. Local limitations
on development ultimately contribute to the loss of land in other areas of
the region that are unable or unwilling to control the pace or intensity of
development. Thus, without a regional land use plan that protects open
space and farmland, the actions of individual jurisdictions to control
growth and preserve land can actually make the problems associated with
sprawl worse rather than better.
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he wasteful aspects of intra-
regional competition for sales
tax revenues come to a head in an
area William Fulton refers to as
“Sales Tax Canyon” in his book, The
Reluctant Metropolis. Located on
the Oxnard Plain along Highway 101
in Ventura County, “Sales Tax Canyon” is a
strip of three cities—Oxnard, Ventura, and
Camarillo—whose cumulative efforts to
attract retail businesses within their borders
has wasted valuable public dollars, drained
economic development from less affluent
cities in the region, and created increased
traffic congestion. 
The intense competition among these
cities for sales tax revenue was spurred on by
Proposition 13. As Fulton states, “In 1978, the
year before the proposition passed, the three
major cities on the Oxnard Plain collected
about $8 million in property tax and $10 mil-
lion in sales tax. In 1979, when the Proposition
13 tax limitations kicked in, the three cities
collected almost $12 million in sales tax and
only $3.7 million in property tax. It was obvi-
ous that, to survive, the Oxnard Plain
cities…would have to focus on sales tax.” 34
Because of the importance of the sales tax
in generating revenue, Oxnard, Ventura, and
Camarillo have each attempted to entice and
accommodate retail stores in their cities while
at the same time working to prevent their
neighbors from doing the same. These efforts
have resulted in the use of vast amounts of
public dollars for land acquisition, tax breaks,
infrastructure improvements, and even cash
payments. The cities have also filed and
threatened lawsuits against each other to stop
proposed retail development—requiring fur-
ther use of limited tax dollars. In every case,
the competition was intensified by the fear of
lost sales tax revenue. Freed from the need to
compete for these tax revenues, these three
cities could have spent their sales tax revenues
on improving public services and creating a
higher quality of life for their residents.
Instead, residents of these cities face increased
traffic congestion, the loss of agricultural land,
and tax revenues tied up for years in deals
with developers. 
Intra-regional competition 
for sales tax revenue wastes 
public dollars and drains 
economic development from 
less affluent cities in the region.
28
Employment per 100 Persons by Municipality, 1994
In 1994, the strongest employment centers
outside of downtown Los Angeles could be
found in areas that are relatively affluent, and
thus less accessible to lower income people
who reside primarily in the core of the region.
These include Irvine (121 jobs per 100 resi-
dents) and Newport Beach (102) in Orange
County and Thousand Oaks (62) and San Buen-
aventura (60) in Ventura County. 
The lowest per capita employment in the
region was in communities of southern Los
Angeles County such as Maywood (13 jobs per
100 residents) and Lynwood (18) and in cities
surrounding San Bernardino such as Highland
(11) and Yucaipa (18). Residents of these cities
are among those most in need of low-skill, liv-
able-wage jobs, yet they are far from the
employment centers that provide them. 
Where the Jobs Are
Data Source:
Southern California
Association of Governments
Note:  
Employment data were not
available for cities marked
“No data.”
The Los Angeles area
experienced an economic
recession during the
period 1990-94. 1994 jobs
data were the most recent
available data.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area Research
Corporation (MARC).
Employment per
100 Persons
Regional Value:  42.4
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Percentage Change in Employment per Capita by Municipality, 1990-1994
Data Source:
Southern California
Association of
Governments
Note:  
Employment data were not
available for cities marked
“No data.”
The Los Angeles area
experienced an economic
recession during the
period 1990-94. 1994 jobs
data were the most recent
available data.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area
Research Corporation
(MARC).
Despite the traditional concentration of jobs
in Los Angeles, per-capita employment there
actually decreased by nearly 15 percent between
1990 and 1994. In fact, more than 80 percent of
the cities in the Los Angeles region saw their per
capita employment decline over the period, at
least partly due to the effects of a national reces-
sion. However, the employment growth experi-
enced in other cities of the region suggests that
the strongest employment centers are located in
areas far outside of the core of the region. 
Cities with the greatest declines in employ-
ment were again located in cities south and
east of Los Angeles, such as Bellflower (39 to 22
jobs per 100 persons), Seal Beach (49 to 30), and
Long Beach (55 to 40). A few cities in San
Bernardino, Riverside, and Ventura counties
also experienced significant declines, including
Banning (39 to 29), Fontana (38 to 29), and
Moorpark (33 to 23). Only a few places saw any
sort of significant growth in employment per
100 persons; these included Irvine (108 to 121),
Thousand Oaks (51 to 62), and Palmdale (23 to
37). These trends suggest that employment
opportunities are dwindling for residents in the
core of the region as job growth occurs dispro-
portionately in other areas of the region.
Employment Opportunities Dwindle in the Core
% Change 
in Employment
Regional Value:  -12.3%
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Spending on Highway Improvements, 1988-1996
Between 1988 and 1996, a significant
amount of money was spent expanding free-
ways, widening bridges, and increasing capaci-
ty in areas outside the core of the region. Some
of the largest and most expensive projects took
place along Interstate 5 in Orange County—one
of the most affluent areas in the region. Others
helped to improve access to growing residential
areas in San Bernardino, Riverside, and north-
ern Los Angeles counties. These improvements,
justified as a response to demand and existing
congestion, do little to reduce congestion in the
long term. In many cases, they encourage peo-
ple to move to these areas and businesses to
locate along them, meaning that any reductions
in congestion are only temporary. Even the sig-
nificant improvements on highways in the core
of the region—including the Century Freeway
and the Harbor Freeway—have done little to
reduce congestion or to help lower-income
individuals access jobs in the employment cen-
ters at the edge.
Highway Spending
Data Source:
California Department 
of Transportation
Note:  
“Highway Improvement”
projects defined as new
road construction, road
widenings, bridge removals
and replacements, and
major improvement projects
done on intersections.
Prepared by the
Metropolitan Area Research
Corporation (MARC).
Projects > $5 Million
(thousands of dollars)
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Urban Sprawl
Data Source:
1990 U.S. Census Bureau 
Tiger Files (1990 map); 
1990 CPH-S-1-2 “1990 Census
of Population and Housing
Supplementary Reports
Urbanized Areas of the United
States and Puerto Rico,” dated
12/93 (1990 data); “1970
Census of Population Volume 1,
Characteristics of the
Population, Part A, Number of
Inhabitants, Section 1, United
States, Alabama-Mississippi”
dated 2/72 (1970 maps 
and data)
Note:  
The Indio-Coachella, 
Hesperia-Apple Valley-
Victorville, Hemet-San Jacinto,
Lancaster-Palmdale, 
Palm Springs, & Simi Valley
urbanized areas did not exist 
in 1970.
Prepared by the Metropolitan
Area Research Corporation
(MARC).
According to the Census Bureau’s meas-
urement of urbanized areas, the Los Angeles
region expanded by more than 1,000 square
miles between 1970 and 1990—mostly in areas
around relatively large employment centers.
Much of this growth has taken place in south-
ern Orange County, in the Simi and Antelope
valleys, and in outlying areas of Riverside and
San Bernardino counties.
In 1970, the U.S. Census Bureau designated
three areas in the Los Angeles region as urban-
ized: Los Angeles-Long Beach, Riverside-San
Bernardino, and Oxnard-Ventura. By 1980, four
additional areas within the five-county region
were designated urbanized: Palm Springs,
Lancaster-Palmdale, Simi Valley, and Hemet-
San Jacinto. Over the next decade, two more
areas were designated as urbanized: Hesperia-
Apple Valley-Victorville in San Bernardino
County and Indio-Coachella in Riverside
County. Over the entire 20-year 
period, the amount of land considered urban-
ized increased significantly, from 1,993 square
miles in 1970 to 3,014 in 1990. 
Legend
Change in Urbanized Area, 1970-1990
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he information presented in this report demonstrates the
need for a regional approach to stabilize communities experi-
encing disinvestment, reduce fiscal disparities, and discourage
sprawling development. As shown in this report, these prob-
lems are closely related to tax policies that discourage regional
economic cooperation, public infrastructure investment pat-
terns that support sprawling development, and fragmented governance
and land planning. As a result, all local governments and residents
throughout the Los Angeles region experience some form of social or fiscal
stress and a reduction in the quality of life that they might otherwise enjoy
through a more orderly pattern of development.
MARC and a growing core of scholars, government officials, business
leaders, and environmental and anti-poverty activists believe that the
problems associated with metropolitan social separation and sprawl call
for a strong, multifaceted, regional response. To combat the patterns that
lead to social separation and wasteful sprawl, there are three areas of
reform that must be sought on a regional scale: 1) greater fiscal equity
among jurisdictions of a region, particularly those with land-use planning
powers; 2) smarter growth management through better planning prac-
tices; and 3) structural reform of metropolitan governance and trans-
portation planning. These reforms are inter-related and reinforce each
other both substantively and politically.
GREATER FISCAL EQUITY
Local governments in the Los Angeles region should gradually move away
from funding services through local land-use decisions and toward a form
of regional fiscal equity among units of government with land-use plan-
ning powers. Sharing local tax resources helps to create equity, reduce
wasteful competition, and foster cooperation—making regional land-use
planning more possible.  It is important to note that in such a system lies
the possibility of both improving services and lowering taxes for the vast
majority of citizens in the region.
Greater fiscal equity between cities with land-use planning powers in
the Los Angeles region can help to reduce disparities and allow commu-
nities to create an orderly and efficient regional land-use plan35 by: 1)
easing the fiscal constraints in declining communities and allowing them
to re-invest in their community; 2) taking the pressure off growing com-
munities to spread local debt costs through poorly managed growth and
wasteful subsidies to developers; and 3) reducing fiscal incentives to
compete for land uses that encourage low-density sprawl. This equity
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California’s school equity 
system points the way toward
a promising solution to reducing
fiscal disparities among cities in
the Los Angeles region.
can be created in a number of ways.
In California, sales tax-base sharing
provides the greatest promise.
Nearly every state and many met-
ropolitan areas in the nation have
already implemented equalization for-
mulas that create greater fiscal equity
among local jurisdictions. A few have
addressed this problem by consolidat-
ing city and county governments or
annexing surrounding communities to
the central city, but this is increasingly
rare. The most common forms of fiscal
equalization are school equity systems
that reduce the dependence of schools
on locally generated revenue (usually
property taxes). The state of California,
for example, has an equalization sys-
tem that provides state money to
school districts unable to meet a mini-
mum level of funding per student. This
makes school funding and educational
opportunity less dependent on local
wealth and at least somewhat more
equitable. In 1996, California’s school
equity system shared more than $17
billion across the state—about $7.9 billion of which went to school districts
in the Los Angeles region.36
While school equity systems such as California’s help to reduce dis-
parities among school districts, lessen the burden on communities with
low tax revenues, and equalize educational opportunity, they do not
address the fiscal inequities between cities and counties that foster waste-
ful land-use patterns. To address disparities among local governments,
several states have created strong general revenue–sharing systems where
a portion of the tax revenue collected by the state is redistributed to juris-
dictions based on a formula that takes into consideration factors such as
population, tax rates, or local wealth. Among these are Michigan,
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A tax-base sharing
system would produce
additional tax base for
more than 75% of the
Los Angeles region.
Light rail is a key 
component of a 
successful multi-modal
transportation system.
Photo courtesy: LACVB, PictureLA.com    Photo credit: LACVB/Michele and Tom Grimm
Wisconsin, and Minnesota. A statewide system of general revenue sharing
that takes into account differences in the local costs of living and govern-
mental services could be even more effective.
A few states have created regional equalizing mechanisms that use
local tax resources to create greater regional equity. Unlike statewide
school equity systems or general revenue–sharing systems, these regional
equity systems respond to both intra-regional competition for property
and sales tax base and to the unique cost of living and property valuation
in a particular regional setting. This is done by pooling a percentage of
local property values and/or taxable transactions (the tax base), redistrib-
uting the pool to the jurisdictions based on need, and then taxing the new
amount in each jurisdiction at an area-wide rate. 
The primary benefit of pooling the tax base rather than tax revenue is
that it produces benefits for multiple levels of government. Since the pool
effectively increases the local tax base of a community, all local govern-
ments that generate funds from that tax base benefit—counties, school
districts, cities, and special districts. Thus, the benefit is much more
widely felt than if revenue sharing was conducted only by cities or coun-
ties, to the exclusion of other local governments. A regional tax-base shar-
ing system in the Los Angeles region would produce additional tax base
for more than 75 percent of the population of the Los Angeles region and
allow for improved local services and lower taxes (see appendices).
Whatever method is chosen, a regional equity system must be simulated
before discussion begins, so that all parties participating can understand its
impact. In order for such a system to generate sufficient political support,
the proposed reform must make a positive contribution to the tax base of
jurisdictions in which approximately two-thirds of the regional population
lives. A substantial portion—if not a majority—of residents who live outside
the central city (as well as in the central city) should ultimately see increased
local revenues for their community and thus better local services. MARC has
modeled several property and sales tax equity proposals for the Los Angeles
metropolitan region; these are discussed in Appendix A.
SMART GROWTH
“Smart growth” is a concept that is gaining increasing attention across the
country. At its core, smart growth means local planning with a regional
perspective. It implies a land-use plan that encourages regional coopera-
tion rather than competition, less destruction of agricultural land and
open spaces, a balanced transportation system, greater access to afford-
able housing, more efficient use of public resources, and, ultimately, less
social separation.
As has been shown throughout this report, there are many costs associ-
ated with the inequitable, inefficient, sprawling growth seen in so many
regions throughout the country, including Los Angeles. If the patterns that
result in social separation, disinvested central cities, and growing fiscal
stress are allowed to continue, the economic and social stability of the
region will be at risk. Worsening traffic congestion, increased energy con-
sumption and pollution, loss of valuable open space and habitat, and
increasing social separation are just a few
of the negative effects that the Los Angeles
region (as well as many other regions
throughout the country) has already expe-
rienced. These unintended consequences
of growth are already degrading the quality
of life for many residents in the region, and
are likely to affect many more people if left
unchecked.
Smart growth is an alternative that
addresses many of these issues and pro-
vides a way for regions to weather the eco-
nomic busts that inevitably occur. It will
also help regions prepare for the unpre-
dictable economic changes that can occur
so quickly in the expanding global econo-
my. A number of scholars have argued that
cities and suburbs within a metropolitan area are economically interde-
pendent, and that economically depressed cities in the core of a region
suppress economic growth throughout the region. Their studies suggest
that when social and economic polarization is minimized and cooperation
maximized, the region as a whole is likely to experience stronger and more
sustained economic growth.37
Although smart growth often means different things to different peo-
ple, several common themes run through most of the efforts being con-
ducted across the country. These include: 1) growth management mecha-
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nisms to facilitate orderly and
efficient growth in the region;
2) policies that ensure that
development will make effi-
cient use of infrastructure that
is in place before land is devel-
oped; 3) a balanced mix of
housing types and costs
throughout the region that
allows employees to reside
near their jobs, allows families
to stay in their community as
their financial situation
changes, and decreases grow-
ing social separation; and 4) a
multi-modal transportation system, providing multiple methods for mov-
ing people and goods throughout the region in the most efficient manner.
None of the characteristics are mutually independent, but rather, must be
seen as components of a comprehensive whole.
Oregon is widely seen as the national leader in implementing regional
smart growth planning. Minnesota has adopted a structure to accomplish
much of what is outlined in the Oregon model, but has often failed to
implement its statutes. Washington, Maryland, Florida, Georgia, and
Tennessee, are among the states that have adopted smart growth land-use
plans, although some have been more effective than others and some are
too new to evaluate. An underlying debate on this issue is growing in more
than half of the country’s state legislatures.
METROPOLITAN STRUCTURAL REFORM
Pundits often assert that effective, long-term regional cooperation is
impossible. However, they neglect to note that all urbanized areas with a
population greater than 50,000 already have a multi-jurisdictional regional
government called a Metropolitan Planning Organization (or MPO) in
place.  An MPO is a body of local officials, appointed by other state and
local officials, that plans and allocates resources for building and maintain-
ing a regional transportation system.38 Though these MPOs are often little
known by citizens, they make extremely important decisions that affect the
future of their respective regions. However, while MPOs have the power to
approve billion-dollar highway projects, they cannot coordinate the local
land uses that are necessary for dealing with growing congestion problems. 
MPOs need to be empowered to address those issues affecting the
entire region—such as transportation, air and water quality, and environ-
mental protection—that cannot be effectively addressed at the local level.
They must be able to make infrastructure and other public investment
decisions that promote the sustainability of the entire region, the stability
of core communities, the efficiency of the regional transportation system,
and the protection of valuable ecological and agricultural lands.
Throughout the country, the primary task of MPOs has been to develop
a regional transportation plan and distribute federal transportation funds
to projects consistent with this plan. Due to the enormous importance of
federal funding in completing regional-scale transportation projects,
MPOs have a significant influence on the social, economic, and physical
form of the region they represent. They are not, however, held directly
accountable for their decisions because the citizens of the region do not
directly elect them. 
Given the significant impact that MPOs can have on shaping regions, it
is essential that they be made more representative and accountable to the
regions they serve. Typically, MPOs make their decisions without mean-
ingful public input concerning the impact of their transportation deci-
sions on the social and economic health of the entire region—particularly
on the older and less affluent areas of the region. Older bedroom commu-
nities, inner-city neighborhoods, and organizations committed to these
areas need to recognize their common interests and form a constituency
in the region to address this lack of accountability.
In the Los Angeles region, the MPO is the Southern California
Association of Governments (SCAG), a voluntary organization of regional
cities and counties. SCAG is the largest MPO in the nation, representing
180 cities, 6 counties, 15 million people, and an area roughly the size of
Indiana. While SCAG does wield some regional planning power—espe-
cially in distributing federal transportation funds, such as those resulting
from the 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation and Efficiency Act
(ISTEA), and more recently, the 1998 Transportation Equity Act for the
21st Century (TEA-21)—its status as a voluntary organization has limited
its ability to conduct planning and develop scale. Regional governance in
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the Los Angeles region is further complicated by the lack of cooperation
on inter-regional matters in the past.39
Despite these obstacles, a significant effort was made in the late 1980s
to create a strong regional body in the Los Angeles region with the ability
to enforce regional land use, housing, and transportation plans. Efforts
were also made to make SCAG more accountable in this process, by mak-
ing its council members directly elected. At the regional level, this effort
was fueled largely by the creation of the “L.A. 2000 Committee,” a highly
regarded task force of regional leaders established by
the mayor of Los Angeles that included representatives
from business, churches, and government. This com-
mittee produced a report that advocated the creation
of two powerful regional agencies: one that would set
policy for land use, housing, and transportation, and
another that would oversee protection of the regional
environment. At the state level, several bills were intro-
duced that would have supported greater regional gov-
ernance and regional growth management—most
notably one by then-Assembly Speaker Willie Brown.
While these efforts ultimately failed, SCAG has made
changes to better serve its members, such as expand-
ing its governing board from 35 to 71 local officials and
creating 13 subregional entities for inclusion in the
transportation planning process. 
Ultimately, MPOs should evolve into bodies that
much more explicitly weigh the effects of their decisions
on the social health of the older parts of the region and
the fiscal and environmental health of the developing
areas. To do this effectively, MPOs should evolve into
structures with proportional representation that fully takes into account
the different types of regional communities and their varied needs. Over
time, more fairly apportioned regional bodies with the proper geo-
graphic scope for regional land-use planning should assume the respon-
sibility for coordinating strategies that can effectively address the grow-
ing regional problems mentioned above. MARC believes that, ultimate-
ly, MPO members should be directly elected.
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ax-base sharing is an important step in regional reform,
because it helps build relationships and coalitions that will
serve to advance other regional reforms. When the financial
implications of land-use planning are gradually de-emphasized,
it becomes much easier to talk about important region-
al issues such as cooperation in land use, environment protec-
tion, and affordable housing.  When the Twin Cities region of Minnesota—
an area that is a leader in regional cooperation—recognized that central
cities and suburbs experiencing fiscal stress could be united on shared
fiscal interests, they overcame some of the more intense social barriers
that had long divided the region. Efforts at regional cooperation in the
Los Angeles region would be greatly advanced if Los Angeles and the
struggling communities surrounding it were to recognize the benefits
that tax-base sharing could provide.
At the outset, the numbers clearly add up to a viable coalition for tax-
base sharing in the Los Angeles region. MARC has created models of sev-
eral possible tax-base sharing scenarios for the region, and most of the
scenarios produce positive results for the majority of the region’s popula-
tion. A few scenarios would actually provide increased revenues and bet-
ter services in jurisdictions where as much as 75 percent of the regional
population lives. While there are countless formulas that could be used in
a tax-base sharing system, one of the most promising examples is pre-
sented here.
It is important to note that a property or sales tax-base sharing system
requires all communities to tax the affected categories of property or
transactions at an area-wide tax rate. In California, under current laws,
these rates would have to be within the provisions of Proposition 13 and
the Bradley-Burns situs rule. In other words, the rate could not exceed 
1 percent plus any rate necessary to pay off voter-approved indebtedness.
Further, since this type of resource sharing relates only to the sharing of
tax base and not revenue, neither Proposition 4 (which requires that rev-
enues in excess of the budget limit be returned to taxpayers) nor
Proposition 218 (which requires that a specific amount of tax revenues go
to schools) would be affected. A jurisdiction’s total revenue (which would
include revenue generated from the new tax base) could still be used as
these propositions require.
Appendix A
A Closer Look at Tax-Base Sharing
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In this scenario, each of the cities and the
unincorporated areas of each county in the region
are required to contribute to the tax-base pool 
40 percent of the growth in their taxable sales
transactions from 1986 to 1996. This tax-base pool
is then redistributed back to the communities based
on a formula giving preference to those communi-
ties with relatively low taxable transactions per capita.
This particular model run produced new tax
base for 77 percent of the total population of
the Los Angeles region. More than $3.8 billion
in taxable transactions were shared in this sce-
nario. Most cities benefiting were found south
and east of Los Angeles, although many cities
throughout the region were net recipients—
including cities with very high property tax
base, but little sales tax base. Less affluent cities
that particularly benefit from this scenario are
Bell Gardens ($662 per capita), Compton
($442), and Inglewood ($374). In addition, all
unincorporated areas would receive disburse-
ments from the regional pool under this formu-
la. Detailed information on this sales tax-base
sharing run is given in Appendix B.
Tax-Base Sharing
Sales Tax-Base Sharing Scenario Tax Base Change per Capita
% of Regional Population
Gaining Tax-Base 76.6 %
Appendix B Hypothetical Sales Tax-Base Sharing
Table 1: Redistribution of 40 percent of Growth in Taxable Transactions 1986-1996 According to Total Taxable Transactions per Capita for Municipalities and County Unincorporated Areas.
Municipality/County
Unincorporated Area
Net 
Distribution
Estimated 
Population 
1996
Per Capita
Distribution
Adelanto ($11,855,684) 13,334 ($889)
Agoura Hills ($18,140,093) 21,185 ($856)
Alhambra ($15,361,917) 88,561 ($173)
Anaheim $46,176,144 293,994 $157 
Apple Valley —   52,756 —  
Arcadia $9,227,186 52,088 $177 
Artesia $3,630,534 16,392 $221 
Avalon ($328,136) 3,404 ($96)
Azusa $13,347,368 43,991 $303 
Baldwin Park $21,068,002 73,538 $286 
Banning ($1,326,785) 23,861 ($56)
Barstow ($50,731,324) 22,264 ($2,279)
Beaumont $3,109,920 10,437 $298 
Bell $17,684,957 36,422 $486 
Bell Gardens $28,970,514 43,757 $662 
Bellflower $20,482,423 65,296 $314 
Beverly Hills ($23,063,526) 33,292 ($693)
Big Bear Lake ($9,943,485) 5,949 ($1,671)
Bradbury $9,878,330 890 $11,099 
Brea ($143,658,999) 34,892 ($4,117)
Buena Park $11,144,920 72,888 $153 
Burbank ($25,332,800) 101,474 ($250)
Calabasas —   18,835 — 
Calimesa —   7,304 —  
Camarillo ($54,115,251) 58,027 ($933)
Canyon Lake —   11,279 — 
Carson $11,013,530 88,186 $125 
Cathedral City ($30,893,011) 35,470 ($871)
Cerritos $3,176,583 55,356 $57 
Chino ($123,842,797) 63,295 ($1,957)
Chino Hills                                            —      49,689 — 
Claremont $11,012,670 34,042 $324 
Coachella $849,705 21,036 $40 
Colton $8,681,413 44,443 $195 
Commerce $298,262 12,722 $23 
Compton $41,221,819 93,314 $442 
Corona ($192,889,731) 99,487 ($1,939)
Costa Mesa $7,992,637 102,344 $78 
Covina $7,462,991 45,954 $162 
Cudahy $11,544,354 24,412 $473 
Culver City $3,003,260 40,539 $74 
Cypress ($156,269,659) 46,517 ($3,359)
Dana Point                                            —      36,077 —  
Desert Hot Springs $6,957,461 14,827 $469 
Diamond Bar —      56,021 —   
Downey $20,726,924 97,621 $212 
Duarte ($59,701,710) 21,911 ($2,725)
El Monte $25,284,929 113,357 $223 
El Segundo ($2,024,920) 16,068 ($126)
Fillmore $6,444,128 12,753 $505 
Fontana ($96,586,144) 103,108 ($937)
Fountain Valley ($127,999,365) 54,451 ($2,351)
Fullerton $22,602,940 122,370 $185 
Garden Grove $36,659,728 151,764 $242 
Gardena $11,166,424 56,836 $196 
Glendale $37,758,157 193,546 $195 
Glendora $14,670,299 51,257 $286 
Grand Terrace $13,257,911 13,181 $1,006 
Hawaiian Gardens $5,877,053 14,515 $405 
Hawthorne $18,639,738 76,751 $243 
Hemet ($19,202,200) 52,558 ($365)
Hermosa Beach $4,298,451 18,691 $230 
Hesperia —   59,287 — 
Hidden Hills $2,351,176 1,865 $1,261 
Highland —   40,418 —  
Huntington Beach $40,017,805 187,664 $213 
Huntington Park $20,598,330 60,200 $342 
Indian Wells ($13,306,845) 3,077 ($4,325)
Indio $10,582,374 42,087 $251 
Industry ($165,659,624) 687 ($241,135)
Net 
Distribution
Estimated 
Population 
1996
Per Capita
Distribution
Municipality/County
Unincorporated Area
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Inglewood $43,454,158 116,089 $374 
Irvine ($357,781,584) 127,540 ($2,805)
Irwindale $10,107 1,091 $9 
La Canada Flintridge $5,641,381 20,028 $282 
La Habra $13,014,270 54,257 $240 
La Habra Heights $15,152,244 6,545 $2,315 
La Mirada ($42,616,632) 45,798 ($931)
La Palma ($24,390,730) 15,544 ($1,569)
La Puente $18,349,003 40,405 $454 
La Quinta ($31,795,963) 18,045 ($1,762)
La Verne ($2,756,747) 32,320 ($85)
Laguna Beach ($6,949,137) 23,851 ($291)
Laguna Hills                                           —     25,084 —  
Laguna Niguel                                        —     55,705 — 
Lake Elsinore ($50,791,703) 25,616 ($1,983)
Lake Forest                                            —     57,779 — 
Lakewood $18,078,911 77,187 $234 
Lancaster $30,503,970 121,079 $252 
Lawndale $9,669,095 29,486 $328 
Loma Linda ($21,950,625) 21,172 ($1,037)
Lomita $8,090,696 20,101 $403 
Long Beach $155,193,666 437,991 $354 
Los Alamitos $1,516,683 12,338 $123 
Los Angeles $955,272,802 3,639,908 $262 
Lynwood $54,577,144 65,966 $827 
Malibu                                                  —   12,184 — 
Manhattan Beach ($25,876,472) 33,920 ($763)
Maywood $20,292,542 29,170 $696 
Mission Viejo                                        —   90,138 — 
Monrovia ($6,968,874) 38,929 ($179)
Montclair $2,074,069 29,923 $69 
Montebello ($26,261,561) 62,166 ($422)
Monterey Park $24,700,878 63,988 $386 
Moorpark ($18,193,019) 27,662 ($658)
Moreno Valley ($101,883,332) 133,420 ($764)
Murrieta                                               —   34,569 — 
Newport Beach $7,265,154 69,246 $105 
Norco ($56,230,261) 24,498 ($2,295)
Norwalk $35,270,779 99,836 $353 
Ojai ($3,027,611) 8,040 ($377)
Ontario ($301,225,680) 142,229 ($2,118)
Orange $15,289,617 120,043 $127 
Oxnard ($24,998,891) 152,778 ($164)
Palm Desert ($157,874,428) 33,471 ($4,717)
Palm Springs $7,322,140 41,698 $176 
Palmdale ($158,825,931) 112,035 ($1,418)
Palos Verdes Estates $20,868,421 13,976 $1,493 
Paramount $13,838,737 53,933 $257 
Pasadena $16,309,726 137,202 $119 
Perris ($49,727,603) 30,478 ($1,632)
Pico Rivera $19,953,422 61,143 $326 
Placentia $9,545,291 45,119 $212 
Pomona $42,873,117 139,860 $307 
Port Hueneme $17,203,910 22,183 $776 
Rancho Cucamonga ($154,201,584) 115,768 ($1,332)
Rancho Mirage ($29,992,478) 10,557 ($2,841)
Rancho Palos Verdes $49,904,522 42,691 $1,169 
Redlands $8,126,698 65,555 $124 
Redondo Beach $11,276,525 63,945 $176 
Rialto ($20,173,278) 80,192 ($252)
Riverside $47,833,034 243,401 $197 
Rolling Hills $22,327,903 1,979 $11,282 
Rolling Hills Estates $972,845 8,193 $119 
Rosemead $24,223,703 54,513 $444 
San Bernardino $33,169,831 181,437 $183 
San Buenaventura $14,399,133 99,992 $144 
San Clemente ($12,143,023) 46,728 ($260)
San Dimas ($27,331,456) 35,099 ($779)
San Fernando ($51,164,903) 23,590 ($2,169)
San Gabriel $11,717,789 39,613 $296 
San Jacinto $14,947,677 23,915 $625 
San Juan Capistrano ($55,407,532) 29,023 ($1,909)
Municipality/County
Unincorporated Area
Net 
Distribution
Estimated 
Population 
1996
Per Capita
Distribution
Municipality/County
Unincorporated Area
Net 
Distribution
Estimated 
Population 
1996
Per Capita
Distribution
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Net 
Distribution
Estimated
Population 
1996
Per Capita
Distribution
San Marino $9,956,390 13,409 $743 
Santa Ana $58,654,963 306,571 $191 
Santa Clarita ($35,555,454) 129,924 ($2,264)
Santa Fe Springs                                   —   15,704 — 
Santa Monica $3,298,941 90,306 $37 
Santa Paula $6,185,604 26,597 $233 
Seal Beach $7,754,284 26,434 $293 
Sierra Madre $15,589,599 11,176 $1,395 
Signal Hill ($92,551,715) 8,780 ($10,541)
Simi Valley ($51,305,631) 102,855 ($499)
South El Monte $3,214,860 21,766 $148 
South Gate $37,174,106 91,102 $408 
South Pasadena $10,000,473 24,881 $402 
Stanton $8,299,070 31,964 $260 
Temecula                                              —   41,850 — 
Temple City $14,992,861 33,055 $454 
Thousand Oaks ($85,480,878) 111,676 ($765)
Torrance $13,282,641 139,889 $95 
Tustin ($222,104,267) 63,780 ($3,482)
Twentynine Palms                                  —   14,756 — 
Unincorporated Los Angeles $626,649,579 978,238 $641 
Unincorporated Orange $77,806,283 181,278 $429 
Unincorporated Riverside $215,815,392 380,512 $567 
Unincorporated San Bernardino $179,916,478 280,611 $641 
Unincorporated Ventura $57,189,030 91,204 $627 
Upland $15,069,415 66,133 $228 
Vernon $0 81 $0 
Victorville ($105,115,097) 59,920 ($1,754)
Villa Park $5,704,603 6,382 $894 
Walnut ($6,047,987) 31,614 ($191)
West Covina $23,862,004 101,956 $234 
West Hollywood $4,641,011 37,195 $125 
Westlake Village ($14,871,625) 7,836 ($1,898)
Westminster $13,961,310 82,749 $169 
Whittier $21,351,187 82,550 $259 
Yorba Linda ($63,665,326) 57,782 ($1,102)
Yucaipa                                                 — 37,394 — 
Yucca Valley —   18,604 — 
Percentage of regional population
gaining sales tax-base:
Note: Municipalities without data did not exist in 1986.
Data Sources: California State Board of Equalization, Taxable Sales in California (Sales & Use Tax) During
1986 Twenty-Sixth Annual Report, and Taxable Sales in California (Sales & Use Tax) During 1996 Thirty-Sixth
Annual Report, Tables 2, 5 and 6 (1986 and 1996 taxable transactions data); California Department of Finance,
Demographic Research Unit (1996 population estimates).
Methodology:
Each municipality is required to contribute 40 percent of its 1986-1996 growth in taxable transactions*
into a tax-base pool.  (For the purposes of these tax-base sharing run calculations, the unincorporated areas
within each county were treated as if they were municipalities; therefore, the terms “municipality” and
“municipal” should be taken to refer to both the actual incorporated municipalities and the surrounding
county unincorporated areas.)  Then, a “distribution index” is calculated to determine what percentage
share each municipality will get back out of the pool.  This distribution index is equal to the municipality’s
population multiplied by the ratio of the metropolitan region’s taxable transactions per capita to the 
municipality’s taxable transactions per capita.  Each municipality’s distribution index is then divided by 
the sum of all the distribution indexes to arrive at each municipality’s percentage share of the tax-base pool.
This percentage is then multiplied by the tax-base pool amount to determine the actual amount the munici-
pality receives back. Finally, the amount the municipality contributes is subtracted from the amount the
municipality receives to arrive at the net distribution to the municipality.
Step 1: 1986-1996 municipal growth in taxable transactions* X 0.40 = Municipal Contribution
Step 2: Municipal population X [(region’s taxable transactions ÷ region’s population) 
÷ (municipal taxable transactions ÷ municipal population)] = Distribution Index
Step 3: Distribution Index ÷ sum of Distribution Indexes = Municipal Share of tax base to be distributed
Step 4: Municipal Share X sum of Municipal Contributions = Municipal Distribution
Step 5: Municipal Distribution – Municipal Contribution = Municipal Net Distribution
*1986 dollars were adjusted upwards by a factor of 1.4471 to convert  to 1996 dollars. 
1986 CPI =109.6; 1996 CPI=158.6 (Base: 1982-1984 CPI=100)
Municipality/County
Unincorporated Area 76.6%
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